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Reply to Romero and Soria 
 
François Recanati 
 
In ‘Optionality in Truth-Conditional Pragmatics’, Romero and Soria 
discuss various senses in which a pragmatic process may be said to be man-
datory (vs optional), and they offer a detailed and most useful taxonomy. The 
issue is important because I use optionality as a criterion to distinguish, 
among the primary pragmatic processes (those which contribute to what is 
said), two main types: saturation processes, which are mandatory, and modu-
lation processes, which are optional. R&S object that this distinction is not 
fine-grained enough. Modulation is sometimes mandatory: it is mandatory 
when, because of a semantic mismatch at the level of linguistic meaning, the 
sentence cannot express a determinate proposition unless the meaning of one 
of the constituent expressions is modulated so as to match the meaning of the 
other constituents. 
I agree that there is a sense in which modulation is mandatory in such 
cases. R&S use my example of semantic mismatch: ‘The city is asleep’ 
[Recanati (2004), pp. 34-36]. There are several modulation options. ‘Asleep’ 
may be understood, via loosening, as contributing the property of being silent 
and displaying a low level of activity. Or, via semantic transfer, it can con-
tribute another property predicated of the city, namely the property of being 
such that its inhabitants are asleep. It is also possible that some metonymic 
process operates in such a way that ‘the city’ itself is tantamount to ‘the in-
habitants of the city’. (This is truth-conditionally equivalent to the previous 
interpretation.) There are many options, and it may be that what is communi-
cated is vague and somewhat indeterminate. But if no modulation takes 
place, the interpretation crashes (as formal linguists like to say). So modula-
tion is semantically mandatory, in such cases. R&S say it is compositionally 
mandatory. 
I think this is a useful category indeed. When discussion of Minimalism 
started [Carston (1988), Recanati (1989)], various senses of ‘mandatory’ 
were already distinguished. In one sense, what is mandatory is what is lin-
guistically triggered. Mandatoriness is a conventional property. In another 
sense, ‘mandatory’ means ‘necessary for a complete proposition to be ex-
pressed’.1 Perry argued that, because there are ‘unarticulated constituents’, it 
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is possible for some pragmatic process to be mandatory in one sense but not 
the other [Perry (1986)]. Kent Bach also thought of ‘completion’ as a process 
that is mandatory in only one of the two senses [Bach (1987)]. I do not think 
we need unarticulated constituents, because everything can be done with 
modulation [Recanati (2010), pp. 22-24]; and I think completion reduces to 
(a variety of) saturation. But compositionally mandatory modulation shows 
that we do need the distinction R&S make between ‘mandatoryL’ and 
‘mandatoryT’. We also need it, as they point out, because a pragmatic process 
which is linguistically triggered may be such that it does not contribute to 
truth-conditional content. Words like ‘but’ display a non-truth-conditional 
form of indexicality and require saturation at another level than that of truth-
conditional content [Recanati (1993), p. 240]. 
I agree with most of R&S’s observations, but not with their criticism of 
my view, which is based on a presupposition I do not share (though I am 
open to reconsideration). The presupposition has to do with the status of 
compositional modulation. Some people [e.g. Pustejovsky (1995), Asher 
(2011)] take compositional modulation to be part of semantics; others take it 
to be a nonlinguistic, pragmatic phenomenon. For Hagit Borer (2005), a sen-
tence like ‘The city is asleep’ does not display any linguistic anomaly; it is a 
perfectly fine, grammatical — and therefore meaningful — sentence of the 
language. Making sense of what an utterance of the sentence says is a differ-
ent story: a story for pragmatics to tell. In some cases (e.g. ‘Colorless green 
ideas sleep furiously’) it is hard to imagine a context in which the sentence 
might be used to say something, but that is never impossible. Again: a sen-
tence that is fully grammatical automatically has the minimum degree of 
meaningfulness which makes it fit for expressing a proposition, provided, of 
course, the context is appropriate. Making sense of what an utterance says is 
a matter of pragmatics, on this view, so we have to distinguish between 
pragmatic meaningfulness and the minimal meaningfulness which comes 
with grammaticality. Putative semantic mismatches make pragmatic mean-
ingfulness harder to attain, perhaps, but they do not affect the grammaticality 
of the sentence and its minimal meaningfulness.
2
 
On the Pustejovsky-Asher view, compositional modulation is 
mandatoryL. On Borer’s view, it is mandatoryT but not mandatoryL. It is man-
datory in order to make sense of what the speaker is saying, but not mandatory 
from a narrow linguistic point of view. I side with Borer in this debate, but 
R&S take the other position: they treat semantic mismatch as a linguistic prop-
erty of the sentence, and argue that compositional modulation is mandatoryL. 
They put compositional modulation on a par with lexical and constructional 
context-sensitivity: in the three types of case, a primary pragmatic process 
has a properly linguistic basis. 
R&S think that semantic mismatches and compositional modulation ob-
ject to my claim that modulation is always optional. But the distinction between 
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optionalT and optionalL is all I need to dispose of the objection: I say that mod-
ulation is optionalL, and that is compatible with claiming that in cases of 
compositional modulation it is mandatoryT. The reason why R&S think they 
have a counterexample to my claim is because they assume that composition-
al modulation is mandatoryL. But that is an assumption I do not make, so I do 
not think my claim has been refuted. 
A related issue concerns Radical Contextualism, a view I find congenial 
and close to that I ascribed to Borer. It is also, arguably, a view held by 
Chomsky, under the influence of ordinary language philosophers (the early 
advocates of Radical Contextualism). Radical Contextualism is the view that 
sentences express a determinate content only in the context of a speech act. 
Now, in cases of semantic mismatch, it can be argued that the sentence does 
not express a determinate content, indeed. What has content is the speech act 
performed by using that sentence (and involving sub-acts of modulation). 
Radical Contextualism generalizes this view to all sentences. Sentences in 
general do not, by themselves, express a determinate content. The pragmatics 
of communication always contributes something to the content that is ex-
pressed, and that means that without a speech act no determinate content is 
expressed. 
The fact that there is compositionally mandatory modulation in some 
sentences (those involving semantic mismatch) is insufficient to establish 
Radical Contextualism. To establish Radical Contextualism, one needs to 
posit a gap between linguistic meaning and semantic content, such that a 
piece of linguistic meaning cannot directly contribute to semantic content 
without help from pragmatics. We have to construe linguistic meanings as ei-
ther very thin or very thick, but in any case, as having the ‘wrong format’ to 
directly occupy a position in conceptual structure and be a thought constitu-
ent [Recanati (2004), pp. 140 ff]. But if we take this position, then, arguably, 
there no longer is any ‘semantic mismatch’ at the purely linguistic level. 
Match or mismatch is match or mismatch between conceptual ingredients. 
On the Wrong Format view, linguistic meanings are not conceptual ingredi-
ents. Pragmatics is required to map linguistic meanings to conceptual ingre-
dients, and it is only when that is done that matches or mismatches can be 
observed. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 In Direct Reference (1993), pp 240ff, following the earlier discussion in 
Carston (1988) and Recanati (1989), I distinguish three versions of the ‘minimalist’ 
principle, in terms of whether the notion they involve is (to use R&S’s classification) 
mandatoryL, mandatoryT or mandatoryLT. 
2 I am indebted to Vincent Richard’s dissertation here (La signification linguisti-
que entre effets de structure et effets de contexte, University of Paris 1-Sorbonne, 2013). 
François Recanati                                                                                             4 
 
REFERENCES 
 
ASHER, N. (2011), Lexical Meaning in Context; Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
BACH, K. (1987), Thought and Reference; Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
BORER, H. (2005), Structuring Sense, vol. 1 and 2, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
CARSTON, R. (1988), “Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Theoretic Semantics”; in R. 
Kempson (ed.) Mental Representations: The Interface Between Language and 
Reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 155-81. 
PERRY, J. (1986), “Thought Without Representation”; Proceeedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, supp. Vol. 60, pp. 137-51. 
PUSTEJOVSKY, J. (2005), The Generative Lexicon; Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
RECANATI, F. (1989), “The Pragmatics of What is Said”; Mind and Language 4, pp. 
295-329. 
–– (1993), Direct Reference: From Language to Thought; Oxford, Blackwell. 
–– (2004), Literal Meaning; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
–– (2010), Truth-Conditional Pragmatics; Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
ROMERO, E. and SORIA, B. (2013), “Optionality in Truth-Conditional Pragmatics”; this 
volume, pp. 00-00. 
 
 
